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REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON DISARMAMENT POLICY

1. The working group on U.S. Disarmament Policy, consisting of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President (Dr. Killian), was established on April 7, 1958, by the Special Cabinet Committee on Summit Preparations. The group was directed to make an initial report on April 15 assessing the adequacy of existing U.S. disarmament policy and the opportunities for new U.S. initiatives in this field.
2. The working group reached no agreement in the course of its two meetings (April 9 and April 14) on specific new U.S. initiatives on disarmament, but did conclude that:
 - a) present U.S. policy should be re-examined and modified to increase its effectiveness from the standpoint of U.S. political and military security objectives.
 - b) the concept of "inseparability" of the various components in present U.S. policy appeared to be a bar to progress in disarmament negotiations and make the West vulnerable before world public opinion.
 - c) the U.S. position should be so formulated and presented as to remove the basis for criticism of its complexity and rigidity without compromising our basic disarmament objectives.
 - d) the U.S. position on peaceful use of outer space should be elaborated and made more specific.
3. The group recognized that the immediate key issue was U.S. willingness or unwillingness to agree to a temporary inspected suspension of nuclear tests apart from other elements of a disarmament program. The

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representatives of the Department of State, CIA and Dr. Killian's office favored a revision of policy along these lines. The representatives of the Department of Defense and AEC did not favor such a change but suggested certain alternative revisions which might be made in present policy if overriding political considerations required such a decision were made. The group agreed that it would not be possible to reach a unanimous agreement on this issue, and that a decision on this matter would have to be made on a higher level in the light of the relevant politico-military factors.

More specifically the proposals of the Departments represented were as follows:

- a) The Department of State representatives presented a proposal for a two-year inspected test suspension, conditioned for its continuance beyond this period on Soviet agreement to a cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.
- b) The Department of Defense informally suggested a less extensive revision loosening the link between the nuclear provisions and other aspects of the August 29 proposals.
- c) The CIA representative suggested that the U.S. should announce in the near future a unilateral two-year test suspension to begin September 1, 1958, ^{and ~~also~~ simultaneously announce} The U.S. ~~should also suggest~~ a unilateral suspension of fissionable material production for weapons purposes beginning immediately and invite UN inspection. The suspension would end after one year if the Soviets did not reciprocate.

- d) The AEC representative believed that the U.S. should propose a

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limitation of testing involving unrestricted testing underground and a limit of 20 tests per nation per year above ground, all tests to have a yield of no greater than 100 KT. However, no limitations should be accepted unless it was linked to Soviet acceptance of some other disarmament measures.

4. The group recognized that other areas of U.S. disarmament policy were equally important and should be examined and reformulated. The Department of State representatives presented specific suggestions for reformulation of U.S. proposals covering the nuclear cut-off, surprise attack zones, conventional manpower and arms reductions, and outer space control. These have not yet been discussed due to lack of time.

5. The working group recommends that:

a) The question of separation of nuclear test suspension from other elements of a disarmament agreement be resolved at a higher level of the U.S. Government;

b) That the group continue to review other aspects of the U.S. disarmament position with a view to determining what specific modifications may be agreed upon in advance of the NATO ministerial meeting at Copenhagen.

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1 - [redacted], Member 2 of
10 - [redacted], Secret A

In reviewing US policy on control and reduction of armaments a principal objective has been to find courses of action which will regain the US initiative on disarmament. Specific proposals have been sought which would give direction to preparations for a Summit meeting and demonstrate to world opinion the continued positive US interest in reducing the threat of nuclear war.

Disarmament proposals for Summit meeting. Approval of the policy proposed in TAB A would enable us to propose specific disarmament objectives to the Soviet Union at an early date. Such specific proposals would test Soviet willingness to engage in serious preparatory negotiation. If rejected or evaded by the Soviet Union this negative Soviet attitude could be turned to propaganda advantage for the United States. The specific proposals for the Summit preparatory talks might be:

1. Agreement to suspend nuclear testing with international inspection for two years beginning September 1, 1958. An interim system of UN observers at present US, UK, and USSR test sites (two for each country) would go into effect immediately on that date, and installation of the additional control posts to be agreed to by September 1, 1958, would proceed as rapidly as possible. The US would state formally that it would resume testing on September 1, 1960, unless agreement had been reached for ending production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons under adequate international inspection, but that such testing would be held only underground.

2. Development jointly by the US, USSR, and other nations actively involved in outer space research of a plan for international cooperation in the scientific exploration of outer space, the outlines of which would be agreed to at a Summit meeting and submitted to the General Assembly this fall.

3. Acceptance of the objective that outer space should be used only for peaceful scientific purposes, and negotiation of an agreement prohibiting testing, manufacture, and deployment (either in the US and USSR or at foreign bases) of strategic missiles. An international technical working party would be established to examine the inspection requirements of such agreement for submission to the Summit meeting.

4. Negotiation of zones of ground and air inspection to prevent surprise attack, including both zones in the US-USSR and Arctic areas, and European zones as outlined in TAB A.

5. Agreement for reductions in conventional armaments and manpower which would be related to the degree of progress registered in regard to 1 - 4, above.

6. Agreement on a forum (taking into account the responsibility of the United Nations) in which further negotiations on remaining disarmament measures, not agreed prior to or at the Summit, would take place.